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The strike of Pullman carshop employees and the subsequent boycott that disrupted rail traffic 
throughout the territory west of Chicago in June-July 1894 marked the culmination of nearly two decades 
of the most severe and sustained labor conflict in American history. Yet until very recently little new 
scholarship has focused on the meaning of the Pullman strike and its historical context. By offering a 
close reading of contemporary perceptions of the strike and by examining the organizational and political 
continuities and discontinuities the Pullman conflict reveals, these essays resituate the strike in its 
historical context. They demonstrate that Pullman played an important role in defining the crisis of the 
1890s, shaping a changing legal environment, spurring the development of a regulatory state, and 
fostering a new politics of progressive reform. 
On September 23-24, 1994, more than two hundred scholars, students, educators, labor activists, and 
interested members of the public gathered at Indiana State University in Terre Haute to reconsider the 
Pullman strike in the light of new historical scholarship in labor history. The conference featured public 
addresses by the historians David Montgomery and Nick Salvatore and Jack Scheinckman, the president 
of the Amalgamated Textile Workers' Union (now UNITE—the Union of Needle Trades, Industrial and 
Textile Employees). Scholars delivered thirty-six papers at thirteen sessions that focused on various 
dimensions of the strike and its meaning. This edited collection contains revised versions of key 
conference papers addressing the significance of the Pullman strike in its wider historical context. 
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The Pullman Strike and the Crisis of the 1890’s 
Introduction 
Richard Schneirov, Shelton Stromquist, and Nick Salvatore 
The strike of Pullman carshop employees and the subsequent boycott that disrupted rail traffic 
throughout the territory west of Chicago in June-July 1894 marked the culmination of nearly two 
decades of the most severe and sustained labor conflict in American history. Yet until very recently little 
new scholarship has focused on the meaning of the Pullman strike and its historical context. By offering 
a close reading of contemporary perceptions of the strike and by examining the organizational and 
political continuities and discontinuities the Pullman conflict reveals, these essays resituate the strike in 
its historical context. They demonstrate that Pullman played an important role in defining the crisis of 
the 1890s, shaping a changing legal environment, spurring the development of a regulatory state, and 
fostering a new politics of progressive reform.  
On September 23-24, 1994, more than two hundred scholars, students, educators, labor 
activists, and interested members of the public gathered at Indiana State University in Terre Haute to 
reconsider the Pullman strike in the light of new historical scholarship in labor history. The conference 
featured public addresses by the historians David Montgomery and Nick Salvatore and Jack 
Scheinckman, the president of the Amalgamated Textile Workers' Union (now UNITE—the Union of 
Needle Trades, Industrial and Textile Employees). Scholars delivered thirty-six papers at thirteen 
sessions that focused on various dimensions of the strike and its meaning. This edited collection 
contains revised versions of key conference papers addressing the significance of the Pullman strike in 
its wider historical context. 
 
The Crisis of the 1890’s 
 
The Pullman strike was a central event in a broader "crisis of the 1890s," which scholars 
continue to regard as one of the important watersheds in American history1. The events of that decade 
had their roots in the Gilded Age, a period of accelerating and bewildering change as a northern agrarian 
society, composed largely of independent proprietors living in loosely connected small towns and rural 
areas, decisively entered the urban-industrial age , in which the majority were wage earners2. During 
this period small to middling family farms and shops producing for regional markets became integrated 
into national and world markets, subjecting farmers and small manufacturers to periodic gluts, price 
swings, and the dictates of railroads, Wall Street bankers, and the country merchants. In the old South a 
rural social structure dominated by large landowners strengthened its hold over newly freed slaves and 
reduced many white independent proprietors to the position of debt-ridden tenants and permanent 
laborers. 
Even as the number of acres under cultivation doubled, for most Americans urbanization, 
industrialization, and immigration constituted the most compelling and remarkable drama of the time. 
The number of urban places increased from 400 at the start of the Civil War to some 1,737 at the end of 
the century, and the percentage of Americans living in cities almost doubled, from 19.8 to 39.1. The vast 
majority of urban residents worked for wages, but the nature of industrial wage work was changing. 
Although mass production technology was not yet dominant, many craftworkers found their autonomy, 
traditional skills, and working conditions threatened by the reorganization of work processes, 
mechanization, and new forms of business organization, though many other workers were able to parlay 
old knowledge into new skills that allowed them to survive and prosper in the new industrial workplace. 
Increasing numbers of workers, especially the bulk of operatives, helpers, and laborers, worked in large 
impersonal factories run by regional and national firms. By 1890, 3,000 large firms employed 125,000 of 
Chicago's 360,000 wage earners. Sixty-six of these firms, each averaging over 500 employees, gave 
employment to approximately 75,000 of these workers. Meanwhile, the continuing influx—dating from 
midcentury—of immigrants from Germany, Britain, Ireland, and Scandinavia made nonnative heritages 
and ethnic diversity distinctive features of the country's urban working class3. 
Traditionally historians of Gilded Age politics have stressed the way that political machines won 
elections by engaging in corrupt practices while avoiding "the real" issues of industrial abuses. The "new 
political historians" of the 1970s, however, argued that conflicts among ethnic and religious groups 
defined voter loyalties and that such cultural issues as temperance mobilized party faithful. Recent work 
by political and labor historians has seriously undermined older characterizations of Gilded Age politics 
and has complicated the ethnocultural thesis. Historians now recognize that Gilded Age parties and the 
municipal and state governments they controlled, as well as nonpartisan reformers of both sexes, dealt 
substantively with such economic issues as the tariff, the currency question, and the curtailment of child 
labor and fought for the establishment of compulsory education and reform of the civil service. 
Corruption, it appears, was exaggerated, and state and municipal governments achieved significant 
structural reforms and expanded administrative apparatuses4. 
Further evidence of the dynamism and importance of Gilded Age politics lies in the fact that 
large minorities of Americans, especially in the South and West and urban areas, expressed grave 
concerns that the social basis of a producers' republic was endangered by the appearance of railroad 
corporations, industrial and commercial "monopolies," ubiquitous urban poverty amidst new riches, 
mass violence during strikes, and urban mores, such as heavy drinking, that seemed to mock the work 
ethic. The constitution of the Knights of Labor referred with moral indignation to "the alarming 
concentration of wealth." Women temperance reformers crusaded against "demon rum." Even before 
the Populist Omaha platform of 1892 propelled the farmer alliances into politics, political unrest had 
generated a number of third parties, including the Greenback-Labor, United Labor, Prohibition, and a 
variety of rural antimonopoly parties that had considerable success at the state and local levels5. 
The crisis of the 1890s appeared as the culmination of a quarter of a century of volatile 
socioeconomic development and growing social and political unrest. The crisis was triggered by the 
financial panic of 1893, which became a full-blown depression lasting five years. Unregulated market 
competition produced a surplus capacity in plant and equipment and endemic overproduction. The 
economy responded with falling prices and wages, a wave of bankruptcies, and a rate of profit below 
the level necessary for the reproduction of capital. The depression precipitated a national political crisis 
by undermining the ways party leaders had managed and contained the new issues and unrest of the 
previous two decades. The crash of July 1893 found a Democrat, Grover Cleveland, in the White House. 
Elected less than a year earlier at the head of a precarious coalition composed of regional, class, and 
ethnoreligious elements, Cleveland responded to the depression in ways that greatly energized the 
simmering insurgencies of southern and western farmers and urban workers, groups that threatened to 
bolt the Democratic party in favor of the newly minted People's (Populist) party6. 
Cleveland tried to restore business confidence, which banking and commercial leaders told him 
meant maintaining gold as the basis for international exchange. That in turn required repealing the 
Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890, a piece of legislation that had barely satisfied agrarian advocates 
of a bimetallic currency. Cleveland's well-orchestrated repeal only exacerbated currency deflation, 
deepened the depression, and outraged Democratic farmers, many of whom believed that the 
demonetization of silver in 1873 had caused their troubles. 
The 1890s crisis also had an important labor dimension. In business downturns in 1873-79 and 
1883-85 industrial employers had reacted to cutthroat competition and overproduction by increasing 
their scale of production, concentrating capital, and joining cartels and vertical and horizontal 
combinations to regulate production, prices, and investment so they could cut costs and restore 
profitability. When industrial employers cut labor costs, they often undermined the viability of existing 
bargains made with craft unions. In response skilled workers during the "great upheaval" of the mid-
i88os began to ally with lesser skilled laborers and operatives in more broadly based, inclusive 
organizations, notably the Knights of Labor. Workers of different skills, races, nationalities, and sexes 
also adopted more militant and effective forms of collective action, such as the boycott and sympathy 
strike, and turned en masse to the movement for the eight-hour day. Though durable trade agreements 
had a precarious existence in the late nineteenth century, the aftermath of the great upheaval 
witnessed the first experiments by organized workers and employers to regulate and stabilize markets 
by taking wages out of competition7. 
The Pullman strike of 1894 culminated almost a decade of labor unrest punctuated by episodes 
of spectacular violence, such as the Haymarket tragedy of 1886. The first three years of the 1890s 
witnessed the strike of Homestead Steel workers against the Carnegie Corporation, the miners' strikes in 
the coal mining regions of the East and hardrock states in the West, a longshoremen's strike in New 
Orleans that united black and white workers, and numerous railroad strikes. Particularly on the railroads 
bothcapital and labor experimented organizationally in regulating market conditions. The nation's 
railroads established patterns of management cooperation in labor matters through the tightly 
disciplined General Managers' Association (GMA), capable of directing the interests of the major 
transcontinental lines in a period of labor crisis. In the meantime railroad workers searched for the 
means to unify the disparate crafts. Despite resistance among craft brotherhood leaders, railroad 
workers joined the Knights of Labor in large numbers in the 1880s, and by 1893 many embraced the 
American Railway Union (ARU), a fledgling industrial union capable of challenging the GMA8. 
The Pullman strike and its crushing defeat through intervention by the federal judiciary and the 
U.S. Army greatly exacerbated President Cleveland's political difficulties. Urban working-class 
constituents of the Democratic party joined southern and western farmers in their outrage and sense of 
betrayal at the hands of the Cleveland administration. In addition the strike coming amidst mounting 
unemployment—dramatized by the march on Washington of Coxey's Army—raised new fears among 
the nation's upper classes that a revolution of the dispossessed was at hand. The off-year elections of 
1894 registered this discontent in a resounding Democratic defeat and set in motion an electoral 
realignment that reshaped the nation's party system by the end of the decade. In the aftermath of the 
Pullman strike rural-based Populists and segments of the labor movement sympathetic to the ARU 
hoped to create a labor-Populist alliance that might counter the growing power of monopolies, bankers, 
and industrialists. To their dismay significant numbers of urban workers instead switched from the 
Democratic to the Republican party. Republican William McKinley's 1896 victory over William Jennings 
Bryan, the neo-Populist candidate of the Democratic party, cemented the transition from the third-party 
system to the fourth-party system and secured national Republican party dominance through 1928. 
The new Republican-dominated party system created the political climate for a resolution of the 
social and economic crisis of the 1890s. The decline of two-party competitiveness in different regions 
and a consequent decrease in the high levels of voter turnout that had characterized Gilded Age politics 
limited the political system's ability to register discontent. This was especially so in the South, where the 
defeat of the People's party and the legal disfranchisement of black voters eliminated any alternative to 
the Democratic party, the self-described "party of the white man." National turnout levels fell 
continuously from the high 70-80 percent range in the1890s to a low of 49 percent in the 1924 
presidential election. Strong parties with voter loyalties defined by ethnoreligious ties gradually gave 
way to weak parties; issue-oriented, nonpartisan progressive politics; and interest group lobbying in a 
greatly expanded regulatory state9. 
A dramatic corporate merger wave between 1896 and 1904 that accompanied these changes 
extended corporate business organization beyond the railroads and restructured the nation's 
manufacturing economy that had earlier been under proprietary ownership. Republican ascendancy 
allowed for the progressive legitimation of the corporation in law and its regulation by federal 
commissions affiliated with the executive branch, developments that by the Woodrow Wilson 
administration suggested an accommodation between big business and the country's democratic and 
liberal traditions. The triumph of a new corporate economy created the "seedbed of a new social and 
economic order." The new corporations' growing ability to centralize investment decisions, regulate 
production, and manage the demand for its products greatly restricted the cutthroat competition and 
the length and severity of the crises of overproduction that had characterized the late nineteenth 
century10. 
Corporations had proved themselves capable of brutally crushing unions, as they had done at 
Pullman, when they deemed labor organization incompatible with their fundamental interests. But the 
Pullman strike proved to be an important moment in the development of new thinking on the relations 
between labor and capital. The efforts of the Civic Federation of Chicago to mediate the conflict, the 
critical appraisal of the strike by the U.S. Strike Commission, and Attorney General Richard Olney's new 
thinking on labor relations, despite his prosecution of the ARU strike leaders, signified acceptance by 
some corporate leaders and their reform allies of the need to recognize responsible unions of their 
employees. The Erdman Act of 1898 codified provisions that promised an expanded role for government 
and an era of labor peace on the railroads. The formation of the National Civic Federation in 1899 
created a new institutional framework for enlisting the nation's largest corporations in a program 
designed to ensure stability in labor relations. These developments prefigured further expansion of 
efforts to legislate labor peace that would culminate in the path-breaking labor legislation of the 1930s. 
The Pullman strike of 1894, then, stands at the intersection of formative developments that have 
determined the shape of labor relations in twentieth- century American society11. 
 
The Pullman Strike and Boycott 
 
The significance of the Pullman strike lies not only in the larger patterns of labor conflict and 
national crisis it revealed but also in the visibility of the town, the company and its founders, and the 
ways a local conflict grew into a strike of national proportions. In 1880 the pioneer manufacturer George 
M. Pullman constructed Pullman as a factory town south of Chicago12. The town was not simply a site 
for manufacturing railroad sleeping cars; it was also an experiment in urban living and social reform. In 
contrast to Chicago's unpaved, grimy streets, its paucity of public services, and its ubiquitous shacks and 
crowded tenements that served as wage workers' homes, Pullman town boasted clean, paved streets; 
pure air; beautiful parks and playgrounds; an indoor arcade containing retail stores, a theater, a bank, 
and a library; neat homes with indoor plumbing; and no saloons. By removing his workers from the city, 
Pullman hoped to insulate them from crime, intemperance, poverty, labor riots, and trade union-
inspired strikes that mugwump reformers of the Gilded Age so deeply deplored. 
Despite scattered labor unrest Pullman's experiment in planned living appeared to most 
observers a stunningly successful demonstration that philanthropy and reform could be a "paying 
proposition" and thus compatible with large-scale corporate enterprise. Its living conditions appeared 
particularly ideal for wives. Only a few observers commented on the coercive paternalism in the service 
of moral uplift and social harmony that lay at the core of Pullman's experiment. Pullman expected 
residents to live and shop in the town, but they could not buy their own homes and had no democratic 
self-government. Nevertheless, Pullman's shop employees engaged in a long battle over piece rates and 
through periodic strikes expressed resentment over arbitrary treatment from foremen. 
The 1893 panic glaringly exposed the underside of the Pullman experiment. The industrial 
depression that would last five years forced the company to produce cars at a loss. In response Pullman 
reduced his work force, cut its wages on average by a third, and declined to reduce prices at his 
company store or the rents on his homes. By December 1893 the Chicago Times reported that "great 
dissatisfaction and suffering prevails in Pullman."13  Meanwhile, to the north, Chicago was inundated 
with "tramps" and unemployed and homeless men, many of them building workers thrown out of work 
by the completion of the World's Columbian Exposition. Following a dreadful winter workers at Pullman, 
who had joined the ARU, decided to turn to their union for support. 
Founded in 1893 by Eugene Victor Debs, an ex-official of the Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen, the ARU had grown out of the persistent efforts of railroad workers as far back as the great 
strikes of 1877 to find an organizational vehicle to achieve unity across skill lines and protect their pay 
and working conditions against the encroachments of railroad management. Mutual scabbing 
(strikebreaking) by members of the Knights of Labor and the craft brotherhoods during the mid-i88os (in 
strikes on the Gould railroads in 1885-86, the Reading Railroad in 1887, and the Chicago, Burlington and 
Quincy Railroad in 1888) had continually stymied labor organization. Following defeat in the Burlington 
strike of 1888, the brotherhoods experimented with federations for several years, but eventually some 
brotherhood leaders and thousands of rank-and-file members turned to a new industrial union. The ARU 
sought to transcend divisiveness by enrolling railroad operatives, laborers, and skilled craftworkers of all 
trades in a single organization. 
The Pullman strike originated in the aftermath of the electrifying April 1893 victory of the ARU 
on the Great Northern Railroad. On May 10 a committee of Pullman workers presented a petition of 
grievances to the company; the next day three members of the committee were fired. The Pullman 
affiliate of the ARU called a strike at once. 
At this early stage of the dispute Pullman workers won wide public support in their pursuit of an 
arbitrated settlement. The Civic Federation of Chicago and John P. Hopkins, the city's mayor, as well as 
an ARU delegation, attempted to mediate the dispute without success. Chicago's press disapproved of 
the company's intransigence. Referring to Pullman, the national Republican party leader Marcus Hanna 
exploded with exasperation, "A man who won't meet his men half-way is a God-damn fool."14 But 
Pullman remained adamant. Just as important, the GMA saw the opportunity to crush the fledgling ARU 
before it reached maturity. When the union's first convention in June 1894 declared a boycott of all 
railroads using Pullman sleeping cars, the GMA appointed its own strike manager and resolved to 
discharge any railroad worker who participated in the boycott. 
Despite significant scabbing by members of the craft brotherhoods, which prevented the strike 
from spreading east, the ARU boycott soon brought the nation's rail traffic to a virtual standstill from 
Chicago to the Pacific Coast. In response the GMA worked assiduously to federalize the conflict. U.S. 
Attorney General Richard Olney, himself a railroad attorney, appointed Edwin Walker, a legal adviser to 
the GMA, as a special U.S. attorney for Chicago. Meanwhile, a series of minor riots and confrontations 
with the militia became the occasion for the press to decry a breakdown in law and order instigated by 
"dictator Debs." On July 1, six days after the start of the boycott, Walker applied for, and the following 
day received, a federal court injunction declaring the strike a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 
The next day, despite an absence of violence, Olney convinced President Grover Cleveland to dispatch 
federal troops to Chicago over the strenuous protests of John Peter Altgeld, the first pro-labor governor 
in Illinois. 
The events of these few days represented a fateful turning point in the strike. The presence of 
federal troops, which permitted strikebreakers to be employed by the railroads, and the demoralizing 
effect of the injunction, which led to the arrest of Debs and other ARU leaders on contempt of court 
charges, combined to facilitate the movement of trains by July 9. The blatant partiality of the federal 
government outraged organized Chicago workers, and sentiment grew for a general strike in support of 
the ARU strikers. Although 25,000 local unionists eventually struck in sympathy, most of the labor 
movement held back while Samuel Gompers and other American Federation of Labor (AFL) leaders met 
at Briggs House in Chicago on July 12 to consider Debs's plea for a general strike. Mindful that the strike 
was virtually defeated and fearful that a direct confrontation with the federal government would 
jeopardize the rest of the labor movement, Gompers and the AFL's executive council counseled against 
a sympathy strike. The strike remained strong in many western railroad centers, but in Chicago it was all 
but over. It took until August 2 for strikers in the West and the ARU to concede defeat. 
A bitter Debs never forgave Gompers for failing to back the strike. After serving a six-month 
sentence in the Woodstock jail for contempt of court, Debs returned to the labor movement as a hero. 
Believing that economic action was insufficient to challenge corporate domination of the lives of its 
employees, Debs soon turned to independent politics. He became the most forceful spokesman for the 
new Socialist Party of America and between 1900 and 1920 served five times as its presidential 
candidate. 
 
The Essays in Historiographical Context 
 
Despite the strike's centrality to the crisis of the 1890s it remains neglected as an object of 
historical study. Historians have looked at the strike in different ways. Those writing in the progressive-
New Deal tradition portrayed it as a rebellion of rational and liberty-loving workers against the 
suffocating paternalism of Pullman's planned community. For progressives the strike represented the 
failure of the laissez-faire model of industrial capitalism, with its willingness to sacrifice workers' basic 
rights and welfare to the dictates of the unregulated market. Progressives championed institutional 
intervention in the market in the form of unions and an activist state15. By the 1950s and 1960s a new 
generation of historians portrayed late nineteenth-century episodes of working-class unrest, such as the 
Pullman boycott, as marginal to core themes in American history. Some emphasized a pre-capitalist 
consensus they believed Americans of all classes shared. Others stressed a continuing process of social 
and economic modernization16. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s historians working in the burgeoning 
field of "new" labor history pushed the boundaries of scholarship beyond the institutionalism that the 
progressives championed as an alternative to the market, and they compellingly challenged the older 
social science assumption that conflict was the exception to the rule in modern American society. Much 
of the new labor history has been social and cultural in nature, embedding the lives and organizations of 
workers in artisan traditions, in class and ethnic communities, and, more recently, in relations of race 
and gender17. Despite its accomplishments the new labor history has not produced a study of the 
Pullman strike comparable in scope to the 1942 monograph by the progressive historian Almont 
Lindsey. Moreover, the general failure of labor historians—with some notable exceptions—to address 
the complex relations between workers and the political system has led them to neglect investigating 
the Pullman strike in the context of the crisis of the 1890s. 
The essays in this collection emphasize several themes central to recent developments in labor 
and political history. They examine continuities and changes in the bases of labor organization and 
strikes stretching back from Pullman and the ARU to the Knights of Labor and forward to the shopmen's 
strike of 1922. They suggest how gender identities shaped contemporary views of the strike and how 
new photographic technology was used to construct and contest the meaning of the strike. Contrary to 
influential recent studies by historians of labor and the law, an essay in this collection views the role of 
the federal judiciary as qualified and ambivalent rather than as uniformly anti-labor. Many of the essays 
challenge the notion that the course of the labor movement in this period was determined by the state 
independent of social and economic pressures18.To the contrary, the social crisis precipitated by the 
events of 1894 and afterward powerfully influenced labor legislation and the course of politics. 
Finally, as these essays demonstrate, the strike was a political event that became an arena in which the 
meaning and future of producerism were contested. Out of the maelstrom of controversy surrounding 
the Pullman strike new currents of liberal reform gained impetus, seeking at once to revitalize 
democracy and promote the corporate reconstruction of American society. 
In the first essay of the volume, "Dress Rehearsal for Pullman: The Knights of Labor and the 1890 
New York Central Strike," Robert E. Weir offers an extended narrative account of the Knights-led New 
York Central strike in 1890 that bore "an uncanny resemblance" to the subsequent Pullman strike. The 
Knight's Grand Master Workman Terence V. Powderly, like Debs four years later, actively discouraged 
the strike but was forced by a rebellious rank and file to lend his support and authority to the walkout. 
Once it was undertaken, the strike was hobbled by persistent conflict with the railroad brotherhoods. 
Moreover, both organizations failed to enlist broader federations of workers in sympathetic strike 
actions that would have afforded critical support. Ironically, it was Debs himself who influenced the 
Supreme Council of the United Order of Railroad Employees to reject a sympathy strike in 1890, just as 
Gompers would later do in 1894. Both strikes faced a formidable array of opponents that included a 
hostile judiciary as well as the combined opposition from railroad capital. Ultimately, the New York 
Central strike tolled the death knell of the Knights of Labor, just as Pullman did for the ARU. 
Susan E. Hirsch in "The Search for Unity among Railroad Workers: The Pullman Strike in 
Perspective" has also utilized comparison to illuminate the Pullman strike. But, unlike Weir, she looks 
ahead from 1894 to the 1922 shop craftworkers' strike and compares labor relations in Chicago with 
those in Wilmington, Delaware. Hirsch shows that Pullman strikers drew significant support from the 
community, both within Pullman and in nearby Chicago. But where such local solidarity did not exist, as 
at the Wilmington carshops and many eastern railroad centers, effective strike action did not 
materialize. By 1922 community support was less important to the success of strikes. Nationalizing 
forces, notably the intervention of the federal government beginning with the Erdman Act and 
intensifying during World War I, created new conditions for solidarity that transcended local class 
cultures and fueled the shopmen's strike. Yet, just as in 1894, weakened by the lack of solidarity from 
other segments of organized labor, the strikers sue beginning with the Erdman Act and intensifying 
during World War I, created new conditions for solidarity that transcended local class cultures and 
fueled the shopmen's strike. Yet, just as in 1894, weakened by the lack of solidarity from other segments 
of organized labor, the strikers succumbed to a federal injunction. Hirsch's conclusions return students 
of Pullman to a pervasive theme in this collection: the paramount importance of government and 
politics in any examination of the labor movement. 
In "A Modern Lear and His Daughters: Gender in the Model Town of Pullman" Janice L. Reiff 
explores the town of Pullman as gendered territory. Reiff shows that the older progressive view that 
Pullman's paternalism undermined the independence—what was then termed "the manhood"— of his 
employees did not go far enough. A different kind of paternalism—men of all classes over women and 
children—also existed but was never criticized by progressive reformers. Indeed, as Reiff points out, 
contemporary American manhood required the subordination of women and children and created 
among workers and reformers a profound ambivalence toward life in Pullman. On the one hand, 
Pullman's shopmen chafed at the company's low wages that prevented them from supporting their 
wives at home; on the other hand, many approved of the way Pullman's paternalism in the town 
reinforced a Victorian family lifestyle. Reiff shows that the boundary between these two forms of 
paternalism was often porous, especially when the company intervened in family life over the heads of 
male heads of household. 
Once the strike was proclaimed, Pullman seemed to have abandoned both kinds of paternalism. 
He not only did not care for his workers but also appeared to have abandoned the women and children 
of his town to destitution. Public opinion swung to the side of the strikers. Eventually, however, the 
Pullman women's active role in the strike belied their public image as helpless victims. After assaulting 
strikebreakers, they were tagged as "amazons," thereby forfeiting public sympathy. Meanwhile, 
Pullman's attempt to succor needy families and strikers' actions in keeping these families from crossing 
picket lines also undermined the formerly strong public support the strike had received. Reiff's 
demonstration of the power of gendered discourse and the grip of the family wage in Pullman makes it 
clear that gender must occupy a central place in any reinterpretation of the Pullman strike. 
Larry Peterson's essay, "Photography and the Pullman Strike: Remolding Perceptions of Labor 
Conflict by New Visual Communication," shows the Pullman strike was the culmination of an extended, 
profound crisis in the representation of the labor question. According to Peterson the pictorial record of 
the strike reveals a "crisis of representation" that derived from labor's new power and, coincidentally, 
precipitous advances in visual technology and artistry. In the 1880s and 1890s images of laborand capital 
had been influenced by styles of visual representation developed in new print media illustrations and 
popular stereopticon photographs. These stylized, often classical constructions arose from a process of 
deliberate selection and choice. The 1890s witnessed rapid technological changes that afforded greater 
spontaneity and opened new possibilities for creating images that embodied underlying patterns of class 
conflict. The flood of images from the strike, while still largely avoiding the actual moments of 
conflagration, reveals a medium capable of providing labor and its grievances new visibility. 
The progressive settlement house reformer Jane Addams became one of the most fascinating 
and significant figures connected with the Pullman strike. In the early stages of the strike Addams sought 
to mediate. Victoria Brown in "Advocate for Democracy: Jane Addams and the Pullman Strike" shows 
how Addams tried to "carve out her own unique stance toward the Pullman strike in particular and the 
'labor question' in general." Unlike previous historians who have viewed Addams as a timid and 
temporizing member of the middle class, Brown portrays Addams as a woman who developed a mature 
philosophical and political position grounded in, but transcending, her experience as a woman. 
Addams's distinctive contribution came in her article "A Modern Lear," which compared George Pullman 
with Shakespeare's King Lear and likened embattled labor to his daughter Cordelia. Addams argued that 
employers' refusal to recognize their employees' autonomy led to tragedy for all. Her goal was not for 
the rebels to win but for the larger interest of the industrial family to prevail. 
Legal historians debate whether society or the law itself was the primary agent in structuring 
the rules by which business was regulated and the interests of workers and their employers adjudicated 
in the nineteenth century. Melvyn Dubofsky in his essay entitled "The Federal Judiciary, Free Labor, and 
Equal Rights" argues that the current fashion that sees an autonomous legal culture as determinative—a 
discourse that "creates" social reality—fails to account for the extent to which the law and the courts 
"echoed beliefs and values that resonated through broader spheres of popular culture." He offers an 
alternative, "mixed" narrative of labor and the law in the late nineteenth century that accords partial 
autonomy to the law and simultaneously sees it reflecting a broader cultural tension between individual 
and group interests. Victorian legal principles upheld a stark individualism that left little space for the 
collective action of workers. Those principles were nurtured by post-Civil War free labor ideas, popular 
social Darwinism, and a tradition of "civic republicanism" that enjoyed wide currency. The Victorian 
commitment to individualism and the free market was challenged by an alternative set of principles 
woven into the practice of trade unions, articulated by academic social scientists, and made palpable by 
the "rising intensity of class conflict." A new legal discourse emerged that rejected the unfettered rule of 
the market and justified group rights and collective action by labor as well as capital. Out of the turmoil 
of Pullman and the labor conflicts of the 1890s a new legal discourse appeared that accorded collective 
bargaining some legitimacy, set new standards of fairness for employment, and rationalized a more 
interventionist role for the state in the relations between railroad labor and capital. This new discourse 
was evident in the final report of the U.S. Strike Commission, in Richard Olney's rethinking of the proper 
relations between labor and capital, in the Erdman Act, and in the reports of the U.S. Industrial 
Commission. 
The idea that Pullman should be understood in the context of the emergence of a "new 
liberalism" is developed by both Shelton Stromquist and Richard Schneirov. In "The Crisis of 1894 and 
the Legacies of Producerism" Stromquist sees a series of developments, not least the Pullman strike, 
which promoted and then shattered an impressive producers' alliance based on the industrial unionism 
of railroad men, coal miners, and workers in other industrial sectors of the economy. The failure of the 
AFL to endorse the call for a general strike in support of the Pullman boycott and the federation's 
reaction to the producerist agenda in the debate over its political program suggest the extent to which 
developments surrounding the strike altered the political landscape. New reform alliances claiming a 
share of the producerist legacy surfaced to challenge the republican patrimony of the ARU and its 
collectivist supporters. Conservative trade unionists rode the crest of the crisis uneasily, neither 
disavowing their own producerism nor affirming the radicals' program. At crucial moments— the Briggs 
House conference, the Congress on Industrial Conciliation, and the AFL convention itself—the trade 
unionists put forward an alternative agenda and cultivated new allies. Among those whose support they 
sought was a diverse coalition of social reformers, mesmerized by a vision of social harmony, and 
reform-minded business leaders and professionals who promoted the federation of civic interests. This 
new liberal politics, which "used a discourse of social harmony to marginalize class-based ideologies," 
nonetheless found pragmatic support among trade unionists anxious to weather the storms of economic 
depression. Its most zealous advocates, however, were a new generation of progressive reformers 
whose contributions lay largely in the future. 
That future is the topic of Richard Schneirov's essay, "Labor and the New Liberalism in the Wake 
of the Pullman Strike." Schneirov shows how Chicago was a laboratory where progressive reformers 
engaged in organizational and political experimentation. In doing so he challenges the emerging 
narrative adopted by many labor historians who view the defeat of the Pullman strike and the labor-
Populist alliance as tragically foreclosing a more emancipatory set of possibilities in twentieth-century 
America. Schneirov argues that a new liberal political movement emerged partly in response to the 
newfound strength of craft-industrial organizations relying on the trade agreement and union label 
boycott. The new liberalism, contends Schneirov, was not fundamentally antilabor or antidemocratic. 
Rather, it was "a synthetic and inclusive movement and mode of thought that drew in significant ways 
on the democratic upsurge of the period and recognized the presence of organized labor and socialism." 
Schneirov focuses on the rise of the Civic Federation of Chicago and its offshoot, the Municipal Voters' 
League, to argue that a liberal reform politics enjoyed considerable cross-class support, including 
important segments of the labor movement. The prospects that this movement awakened among 
reformers served to stimulate the launching of the National Civic Federation, which after 1899 drew 
together corporate leaders, trade unionists, and reformers in furtherance of a new liberal agenda in the 
Progressive Era. 
In the epilogue, "The Pullman Boycott and the Making of Modern America," David Montgomery 
points out that the Pullman confrontation "framed issues involving the most desirable relationship 
between organized society and what is called the 'free market' that haunt our current discussion of the 
Pullman boycott, not like ghosts of Christmas past but like ghosts of Christmas yet to come." Drawing on 
Karl Polanyi's classic study, Montgomery argues that corporate and government regulation of market 
activity was society's way of protecting itself from the ravages of the self-regulating market19. In our 
time, as the market is unleashed from regulatory control, we are compelled to ask, as Debs did a 
hundred years ago, who will champion society's interests vis-a-vis the market. Montgomery's point was 
given added poignancy by the fact that bitter, ongoing struggles, whether of Staley workers in Decatur, 
Illinois, Bridgestone/Firestone rubber workers in Des Moines and Decatur, or Caterpillar workers in 
Peoria, were never far from the minds of conference participants. 
 While the legacies of the Pullman strike continue to be contested, these essays testify to the 
pivotal importance of this strike and its aftermath for understanding the course of working-class history 
and American history. They also suggest the continuing vigor of the new labor history, even as it ages, 
and its engagement with questions that illuminate in new and unexpected ways one of the most 
important events in labor's past. 
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